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New Zealanders have always liked to see themselves as leading the
world. In the 1890s, New Zealand became the first country to grant women
the vote, unions were incorporated into the state industrial relations machinery through the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, and oldage pensions were introduced. The Labour Party was founded in 1916 and,
constitutionally linked to the union movement, grew steadily as a political
force. The first Labour government, elected in 1935, institutionalized the
embryonic welfare state with subsidized housing, free education and health
care, and more generous income support. This model of welfarism topped
up the income of the "working man and his family," a policy which assumed the existence of full employment and two-parent families led by
men.
In the 1950s and 1960s, a corporatist style of welfarism continued under the (conservative) National government. Substantial state investment in
transport, electricity, and communications infrastructure-and in projects
such as forestry-was designed to support domestic production for domestic
consumption, provide jobs, and foster regional development. This delivered
a high standard of living for most Pakeha (non-Maori), but it also fostered a
dangerous degree of complacency and political and intellectual laziness. As
a result, the "left" was badly placed to anticipate and resist the neo-liberal
tide that began sweeping the country in 1984.
The union movement had particular problems. The hierarchy was
overwhelmingly white, male, and politically sectarian. Although there was
an upsurge of militancy in the later 1970s, sustained campaigns were rare
and generally unsuccessful. Virtual compulsory unionism had fostered a
false sense of power and an accompanying neglect of the rank and file constituency, while pre-occupation with the Labour Party as the conduit robbed
the union movement of political imagination.
Maori relationships to the interventionist welfare state were ambivalent.
The colonial state offered a palliative and a means for survival; at the same
time, it continued to destroy the rights to tribal political, economic, and
*

Professor of Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997

1

CaliforniaCALIFORNIA
Western International
Law
Journal, Vol. 28, No.
1 [1997],
Art. 18[Vol. 28
254
WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
JOURNAL

cultural self-determination which the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 had guaranteed. Maori political responses had become constrained by what they considered possible for an indigenous minority within a system of colonial
majority rule. While Maori comprised a significant number of the unionized
working class, they remained just as invisible and powerless in the union hierarchy, which paid little heed to specific Maori concerns. As Maori politics
became more radical in the 1970s, focusing on land rights, racism, and sovereignty, relations with the unions were often fraught.' The potential forces
of cooperative resistance were weakened even further.
The radical structural- adjustment program begun by the Labour government in mid-1984 was extended by National from 1990 to 1996 and, despite the introduction of proportional representation, continued under a coalition of National and New Zealand First during 1997 . Over those twelve
years, the New Zealand economy was systematically exposed to the forces
of global capitalism, the guarantee of full employment and a living social
wage was withdrawn, and the welfare state was seriously eroded. The
cheerleaders for this revolution claimed New Zealand was once more leading the world. These voices represented the winners, a combination of the
old and new elite. The costs they imposed on Maori, women, paid and unpaid workers, the elderly, the young, the poor--and the political and ethical
crisis this provoked-were conveniently ignored.
These have been turbulent, destructive, and depressing years for New
Zealand workers and unions (and many others). This Article examines the
combined impact on them of labor market deregulation and other key elements of the restructuring. By locating these developments in their political
context, the Article seeks to identify some challenges which unions must
address if they are to play a meaningful political role in the years ahead.
THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT

The fourth Labour government was elected in 1984, following nine
years of economically conservative and politically authoritarian rule under
National, led by Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. Labour's election campaign promised to restore compulsory unionism, which Muldoon had abolished the year before;3 remove a wage freeze imposed in 1982; re-establish
1. Some unions did, however, play a significant role in the anti-apartheid movement
from the 1960s to 1980s, which began with protests over exclusion of Maori from the 1959
rugby team to tour South Africa. A number of unions also provided significant support during several high-profile land occupations in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
2. New Zealand First, the minority partner in the coalition government, campaigned on
an anti-privatization, anti-foreign investment, and anti-immigration platform that was highly
critical of the structural adjustment program. Their Coalition Agreement with National imposed some constraints on privatization of a few remaining strategic assets, such as the stateowned electricity corporations, New Zealand Post, and Television New Zealand, although
even these were progressively undermined.
3. Industrial Relations Amendment Act § 5, 1983 (N.Z.).
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tripartite wage and incomes conferences; and consult on economic policy.
These promises were largely honored, at least in form." But their effect was
neutralized by the deregulatory agenda which the Treasury technocrats, Labour's Finance Minister Roger Douglas and their political and private sector
allies, relentlessly pursued. Treasury's initial blueprint for restructuring the
New Zealand economy, set out in their 1984 post-election briefing papers,'
insisted that "labor market flexibility" was necessary to deal with rising unemployment-then just above 3 percent. This concern with unemployment
receded as the official rate rose. Settling for a "natural" unemployment rate
of around 6 percent, Treasury insisted instead that labor market deregulation
was critical to economic growth. The targets were consistent throughout: the
national award system, occupation-based bargaining, centralized arbitration,
government wage-fixing, and compulsory union membership.
Dismantling such a centralized and highly regulated labor regime
would never be easy. Given the Labour Party's historic alliance with the
trade union movement, any direct move to deregulate the labor market and
de-unionize the workforce would be divisive and provoke resistance. Furthermore, the unions had some supporters in the Cabinet, although not
among the powerful Finance Ministers. The Labour government opted instead to "modernize" the unions by redesigning the labor laws so unionism
could survive in the deregulated marketplace: compulsory arbitration was
withdrawn,6 unions were required to consolidate to secure recognition,7 and
employers were given the option of enterprise agreements in larger work-

sites.8

At the same time, however, Labour created the conditions in which
radical labor market deregulation could occur. Market deregulation, trade
liberalization, state sector restructuring, and strict monetary policy saw a

4. The wage freeze regulations were revoked in 1984, and the Economic Stabilisation
Act was repealed in 1987. Economic Stabilisation Act Repeal Act, 1987 (N.Z.). The Industrial Relations Amendment Act § 3, 1984 (N.Z.) made provision for a tripartite wage conference and, potentially, for consultation on economic policy. An unqualified preference clause
was reintroduced in the Industrial Relations Amendment Act § 4, 1985 (N.Z.).
5. NEw ZEALAND TREASURY, ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (1984).
6. Industrial Relations Amendment Act § 13, 1984 (N.Z.). Labour was offering to introduce a mild version of final offer arbitration when it lost the 1990 election.
7. Labour Relations Act § 6, 1987 (N.Z.).
8. Labour Relations Amendment Act § 16, 1990 (N.Z.).
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massive rise in unemployment9 and seriously undercut the union base,
which had never recovered from the brief spell of voluntary unionism from
1983 to 1984. The removal of subsidies and tariff protections, in particular,
devastated the industrial and agricultural workforce. Labour transferred tens
of thousands of state employees to aggressively commercial state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), most of which were later privatized. The workers lost
their public service status, and many were made redundant. The remaining
public service was converted to run on entrepreneurial lines as the equivalent of private firms. The legislation which achieved this, the State Sector
Act 1988, was introduced without any prior consultation with the Public
Service Association (PSA).
Union response to Labour's restructuring was muted. The main private
and public sector union organizations consolidated in 1988 to form the New
Zealand Council of Trade Unions (CTU) in an attempt to strengthen their
voice. Rather than tackling "their" government directly and publicly, union
leaders chose to work for change from within. Attempts to secure a tripartite
"compact" between government, unions, and employers met with limited
political support from government, skepticism from many unionists, and
employer intransigence. At the end of six years of Labour rule, the unions
were weak and deeply compromised.

9. Labor market corn

siion 1985-95 (thousands):
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Total
civilian employment

1329 1544 1557 1508 1468 1481 1461 1467 1496 1559 1632

Agriculture

148

167

161

156

151

157

157

159

158

162

158

Industry

430

444

425

393

372

364

343

334

351

390

410

(Other
services)

751

933

965

56

41

955

)57

?71

985

1006 1064

Unemployment

51

65

66

113

125

168

169

157

138

110

7.1

7.8

10.3 10.3 9.5

8.2

6.3

Unemployment rate
as % of civilian
labor force

.1

.0

.0

89

.6

OECD ECONOMIC SuRVEY:NEw ZEALAND, 183: Table D (1996).
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THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991 (ECA)0

The conservative, and traditionally anti-union, National Party became
the government in October 1990. Within two months, the Employment
Contracts Bill had been introduced and NZ$1.3 billion of benefit cuts announced. The ECA came into effect on May 15, 1991, as the country struggled through a deep recession and official unemployment rose towards its
March 1992 peak of just over 11 percent."
The ECA abandoned national award coverage and compulsory unionism in favor of individual employment contracts. The new employment
game was to be played out on the "level playing-field" of the labor market,
between an individual employer and the individual worker. They each could
represent themselves in these dealings, or choose their own negotiating
agent, who might be a union member, a private sector consultant, a lawyer,
or almost anyone else.'2 One worker or his or her agent had no right to know
what another had negotiated. A contract had to be filed with the Secretary of
Labour only when it covered 20 or more people, and even then it would not
be a public document. 3 Contracts with state employers were excluded from
disclosure under the Official Information Act 1982. Collective contracts
would be allowed only if the employer agreed.'
Unions lost all special privileges, including their tax-exempt status. Indeed, except for a transitional clause, the legislation no longer referred to
trade unions. They became "employees' organizations" with the narrow role
of furthering the employment interests of their members. 5 No employment
contract could require workers to join, or not to join, such an organization.
Instead, unions were required to compete with one another and with outside
consultants who touted their services, sometimes with employer support, to
potential worker clients.
Behind the veil of neutrality, the Act was stacked against workers and
unions in favor of the employer. Unions had no automatic right to represent
their members in negotiations; specific authorizations had to be secured in
every new negotiating round. 6 Nor was there any right for unions or anyone
else to access a workplace to seek the authority to represent workers on that
site. 7 That allowed employers to determine which potential bargaining
agents would gain access to their workplace and workforce. Once authorized, the bargaining agent had the right to enter the workplace at any reasonable time to discuss negotiations with those they had authority to repre10. Employment Contracts Act, 1991 (N.Z.) [ECA].
11. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, KEY STATISTICS 35, Table 3.01 (June 1992).
12. ECA § 10.
13. ECA§24.
14. ECA § 20.
15. ECA § 2.
16. ECA § 12.
17. ECA § 13.
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sent. 8 But even then they could not compel the employer to negotiate-or if
they did negotiate, to do so in good faith.
Rules relating to industrial action also changed. Strikes became legal
only in connection with negotiations for a collective contract, after the existing contract had expired, 9 and in limited circumstances for health and
safety.2" As a result, employers could let the contract lapse and play off
market conditions against the threat of industrial action. Strikes aimed at
multi-employer coverage were prohibited, even where firms fell under the
same corporate umbrella.2 While the Act imposed some restrictions on
harsh and oppressive tactics and agreements,22 the status of common law
remedies relating to unfair or unconscionable bargains remained unclear."
The concept of contributory fault was introduced in personal grievance
claims.24
National made other changes to employment law. The Employment
Equity Act, passed just before the 1990 election to provide equal pay for
work of equal value, was one of the first to be repealed.' The Trade Union
Education Authority was abolished, along with paid time for education and
training of union officials and delegates. 26 The Shop Trading Hours Repeal
Act, passed by Labour in 1989, had retained some protections for workers;
these protections disappeared under the ECA. There was no minimum youth
wage until 1994 when, after repeated expos6s of gross exploitation, it was
set at around 60 percent of the adult minimum wage.'
Occupational health and safety became increasingly self-regulated
through performance-based incentives. The comprehensive, no-fault accident compensation system was redesigned, eligibility was cut, and pay-out
levels reduced. 29 Lump sum compensation was abolished, as was the right
to free medical treatment for workplace injuries and full payment of burial
costs.3" Family income-related compensation after death was limited to five
18. ECA § 14.
19. ECA §§ 63(a), 64(1).
20. ECA § 71.
21. ECA § 63(e).
22. ECA § 57. These have proved to be of limited practical effect; see Adams v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.) Ltd. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982; Roche v. Urgent Medical Services Homecare Ltd. [1995] 2 E.R.N.Z. 159.
23. See Peter Kiely, Employment Law Update, in RAYMOND HARBRIDGE Er AL.,
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACrS: BARGAINING TRENDS AND EMPLOYMENT LAw UPDATE 1995/96, at

63-64 (1996).
24. Employment Contracts Act § 40(2), 1991 (N.Z.).
25. Labour Relations Amendment Act (no. 2) § 4, 1990 (N.Z.).
26. Union Representatives Education Leave Act Repeal Act, 1992 (N.Z.).
27. Minimum Wage Regulations cl. 2, 1994 (N.Z.).
28. Health and Safety in Employment Act, 1992 (N.Z.).
29. Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act, 1992 (N.Z.).
30. In December 1993, the Minister of Labor acknowledged the government was in
breach of Article 9 of ILO convention No.17, relating to medical treatment costs for work
injuries. The CTU has complained to the ILO of additional breaches relating to Conventions
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years. The funding burden for non-workplace accidents was shifted from
employers to workers and other individuals, reversing a trade-off agreed to
by employers in the original scheme. Despite these changes, the right to take
civil action for personal injury, which had been abolished when the scheme
was introduced in 1972, was not restored.
THE EFFECT OF LABOR MARKET DEREGULATION

All these were logical consequences of an ideology that celebrated the
unfettered expansion of capital in the national, and global, marketplace. The
ECA had two immediate goals: to destroy the power of unions and to subject pay and conditions of employment to market (employer) demand. It
initially succeeded with both.
The Unions
The Act's impact on an already weakened union movement was devastating. In December 1985, some 43 percent of the workforce was unionized
under 259 unions. By September 1989, the density was the same, although
the number of unions more than halved as a result of minimum membership
requirements introduced in the Labour Relations Act 1987. When the ECA
was passed in 1991, membership density was still 41 percent or 38 percent,
depending on the measure used. By December 1995, that figure was down
to 21.7 percent and only 82 unions remained' However, the rate of decline
had slowed. The number of unions with fewdr than 1000 members had in12, 17, and 42. COALITION ON ACCIDENT COMPENSATION, Policy Proposal No. 1, Policy Proposal to the Minister in Charge of Accident Compensation Corporation, The Honourable
Bruce Cliffe (April 1994).
31. Unions, membership, and density 1985-1995:
Unions

M'shin

Density

December 1995

25)

693006

43-5%

Sentemher 199

119

648825

44.7%

May 1991

R0

603119

415%

December 1991

66

514395

354%

December 1992

;R

42. 160

9.9%

Decemher 1993

67

409.112

26-8%

December 1994

92

375906

934%

December 1995

1

362

00

217%

Aaron Crawford et al., Unions and Union Membership in New Zealand: Annual Review for

1995, in 21 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL 188, 189, Table 1 (1996).
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creased dramatically, while the proportion with more than 10,000 members
remained fairly constant? 2
More men than women appeared to have left unions. The fall in membership was spread unevenly across sectors, and a number of unions even
ceased to exist. Union membership fell more than 60 percent in the five
years to 1996 in the retail, wholesale, restaurants, cafes, and accommodation
sectors; agriculture, fishing, and hunting sectors; mining and related services; and in the construction and building services. Those most severely affected were in the productive sectors where industry deregulation, trade liberalization, and exposure to export markets hit hardest, and those where
women predominate and are traditionally unorganized. Those which survived best were in the growth areas of services, communications, energy,
and residual public services. "
The shift from national awards to collective and individual contracts
and the burdensome authorization requirements meant a massive increase in
union workloads. In 1992, for example, the Department of Social Welfare
required the Public Service Association (PSA) to provide 6,200 written
authorizations then still refused to negotiate, as it was legally entitled to
do.34 The National Distribution Union went from 55 negotiating rounds to
32. Id. at 190.
33. Union membership by industry 1991-1995:
Industry

Dec 1991

Dec 1995

%Decline

Agriculture, fishing & hunting

14,234

4120

71

Mining and related

4730

1593

66

Manufacturing

114,564

76,714

33

Energy

11,129

11,312

(2)

SConstruction

14,596

5372

63

Trade

64,335

17,559

73

Transport., conunun.

52,592

49,156

7

Finance

32,219

26,241

19

Public services

205,925

170,133

17

TOTALS
514,324
362,200
30
Aaron Crawford et al., Unions and Union Membership in New Zealand: Annual Review for
1995, in 21 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 188, 191, Table 3 (1996).
34. BureaucraticDSW Tactic Backfires, PUB. SERVICE ASS'N J., June 1992.
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700. Most unions stopped organizing in workplaces of less than 10, effectively abandoning a quarter of the workforce. Under these conditions, the
style of union also changed. Traditional union strategies and class perspectives were pressured by new entrepreneurial, corporate unions that competed for members, engaged in mergers and takeovers, allegedly poached
from other unions, and viewed their members as assets on the corporate balance sheet. The activities of the Engineers Union (which, following a 1996
merger with the Printing and Manufactures union, spanned energy, aviation,
forestry, telecommunications, and publishing) were especially controversial.
The position of the main umbrella group, the CTU, attracted mounting
criticism. For reasons that remain incomprehensible to many, the CTU decided there was not enough support to mount an effective nation-wide campaign against the introduction of the ECA in 1991. Instead of confrontation,
it espoused a style of corporatism whereby government, employers, and
unions would cooperate within the deregulated market to make the economy
grow. In 1993 the CTU defined tripartism as follows:
...a complement to political democracy and a market economy. Triparpolicies
tism introduces a social dimension into structural adjustment
s social
3
the
can help
Tripartism
consultation.
through active dialogue and objectives
cooperation.
through
partners meet their economic
While the decline in CTU union affiliations was due mainly to mergers,
dissatisfaction with its position and performance became more overt over
the years. Offering itself as an alternative was the fledgling Trade Union
Federation (TUF). TUF membership included many unions most severely
hit by trade liberalization, and it was an active critic of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), as well as the tariff reduction program. Its activities
during 1996 included a mobilization against the privatization of forestry,
working alongside local Maori, and a campaign to raise the minimum adult
wage to $7.50 an hour. In 1996 about 80 percent of union members belonged to unions affiliated with the CTU, while around 7 percent belonged
to unions affiliated with the TUF.36
Industrial action fell dramatically after the ECA was introduced, due
largely to the deep recession and union disorganization. By 1995 it was rising again, as some unions finally took a stand. Teacher and public sector
unions were especially active, refusing to accept an effective real wage
freeze at a time of growing government surpluses. Major industrial action
hit court administration, the Inland Revenue, Department of Survey and
Land Information, polytechnics, and Housing New Zealand-all threatening
35. CTU, Industrial Relations Policy: A Summary of Main Points, Address to Special
Affiliates Meeting of the NZCTU (May 1993).
36. RAYMOND HARBRIDGE & KEvIN HINCE, A SOURCEBOOK OF NEW ZEALAND
TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS 14 (1994).
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to bring the core functions of government to a standstill. In the year up to
July 1996, the official number of stoppages was 74, the highest since the
ECA was introduced.'
Reflecting this trend and the increased role of contract law, the ideological battle between labor and capital moved from the worksite into the
courts. Initially, the Employment Court and the Court of Appeal took a proemployer line in interpreting the Act, especially on legality of lockouts,38
and attempts to go behind the unions in negotiations. 9 This line changed
around the time that the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was considering a CTU complaint that New Zealand was in breach of the conventions on collective bargaining and freedom of association. ' Subsequently, a
serious split in judicial positions appeared between those who adopted what
is often termed a "fairness" approach and others who advocated a "law and
economics" line which intrinsically favored employers.
This tension came to a head in two 1996 cases in the Court of Appeal
alleging employer breach of section 12(2) requirements to recognize an
authorized bargaining agent. In both the New Zealand Fire Commission v.
Ivamy4" and Airways Corporationof New Zealand v. Airline Pilots Association4' cases, a majority rejected an earlier decision that employers' freedom
of expression to impart information took second place to workers' objections to receiving it. They found that authorization of a bargaining agent did
not prevent attempts by the employer to provide factual information, or to
establish the reasonableness of their stance on a particular issue which all
parties knew was the subject of negotiations. In a strongly worded dissent,
Justice Thomas warned that the decision would seriously reduce the effectiveness of collective bargaining: "[I1t is not to be unexpected that employers and employees alike may conclude that collective bargaining in the form
recognized in the Employment Contracts Act is largely vitiated." 3 Raymond
Harbridge suggests that the implications of these cases might be restricted to
small workplaces or new employers setting up greenfield sites who are able
to deny access to unions to recruit. In workplaces where a union culture is
well established, he believes circumventing the union would be more difficult.M That remains to be seen.
Fueling these internal tensions were strident and personalized attacks
37. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, KEY STATISTICS 38, Table 3.09 (January/February 1997).
38. See, e.g., Paul v. New Zealand Soc'y for the Intellectually Handicapped [1992] 1
E.R.N.Z. 65.
39. Adams v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.) Ltd. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982.
40. For a discussion of these developments see JANE KELSEY, THE NEw ZEALAND
ExPERIMENT 188-201 (2d ed. 1997).
41. New Zealand Fire Service Comm'n v. Ivamy [1996] 2 N.Z.L.R. 587.
42. Airways Corp. of N.Z. Ltd. v. New Zealand Air Line Pilot's Ass'n [1996] 2
N.Z.L.R. 622.
43. New Zealand Fire Service Comm'n v. Ivamy [1996] 2 N.Z.L.R. 587, 621.
44. RAYMOND HARBRIDGE ET AL., EMPLOYMENT CONTRAcTS: BARGAINING TRENDS AND

EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 1995/96, at 51 (1996).
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on judges adopting the "fairness" approach from the Employers' Federation,
Business Roundtable," and the business media, ' supported by the newly appointed editor of the New Zealand Law Journal, and by law-and-economics
icon Richard Epstein.4' Claiming that the Employment Court and Justice
Thomas were distorting the unambiguous intention of the ECA, they called
for the abolition of the Employment Court, and for labor contracts to be
treated the same as any other commercial transaction in the ordinary courts.
The proposal enjoyed support from National's leadership, as discussed below.
Wages and Conditions
The impact of the ECA on earnings was felt as soon as the one-year
rollover of existing awards ended. Between May and August 1992, average
weekly earnings fell by $5, mainly through reduced penal rates and the pressures of recession4' From mid-1993 to the end of 1995, wages remained unchanged for almost one-third of jobs, despite CPI increases of 6.5 percent. 9
Between December 1994 and December 1995, the official Real Wage Rate
Index fell 1.2 percent.5" The public sector faced serious real wage declines.
Contracts monitored by the Industrial Relations Centre (IRC) at Victoria
University showed increases in the year up to December 1995 of 2 percent
overall, but only 1.4 percent for core government and 0.6 percent for government trading enterprises."' The inflation increase was 2.9 percent. While
average total weekly earnings of employees were 2.5 percent higher, this
number nonetheless reflected a significant increase in hours worked.'
During 1996 the situation improved slightly. The minimum adult wage
was increased to $255 for a 40-hour week, at $6.37 an hour (still $20 less in
real terms than in 1990), and the youth rate was $153, or $3.82 an hour.
Pressure from industrial action and workers' refusal to tolerate further real
pay cuts saw average total hourly earnings increase by 3.3 percent in the
May 1996 year (with the CPI increasing 2.2 percent). This was the largest
annual increase since August 1991. Ordinary time hourly earnings grew by
3.4 percent, although female ordinary hourly earnings were still only 80.6
45. BERNARD ROBERTSON,

THE STATUS

AND

JURISDICTION

OF THE NEW ZEALAND

EMPLOYMENT COURT (1996).
46. Roundtable Lashes Judges for Being Judicial Activists, NAT'L Bus. REV. May 17,
1996; Courts Too Slow for Employers, NAT'L BUS. REV. Oct. 25, 1996; Dump the Employment Court, NAT'L BUS. REV. Jan. 31, 1997.
47. RICHARD EPSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND THE JUDGES. THE CASE FOR SIMPLE RULES AND
BORING COURTS (1996); Courts Should Not Play With Employment Act, N.Z. HERALD, May

21, 1996.
48. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, KEY STATISTICS 56,
49. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, KEY STATISTICS 47,
50. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, KEY STATISTICS 43,
51. THEEMPLOYMENTCONTRACT5 (Dec. 1995).
52. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, KEY STATISTICS 46,
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percent of male earnings, down slightly from 81 percent in February 1996.
The increase in average weekly earnings of employees was lower, at 2.5
percent. This number reflected the slowdown in the economy, with the average number of weekly paid hours of employees continuing to fall. 3
Coverage by collective employment contracts (CECs) fell from an estimated high of 721,000 in 1989/90 to around 400,000 in 1996, mainly
through the collapse of multi-employer bargaining. According to the CTU,
only 23 percent of workers were then in CECs, and only one-sixth of those
were in workplaces of less than 100, where three-quarters of workers were
employed. Collective coverage was especially low in agriculture/forestry/fishing, accommodation and cafes, construction, property and
business services, and wholesale trade where only 10 percent were covered.'
However, maintaining collective coverage was no guarantee against the
erosion of pay and conditions. The IRC's 1995/96 survey of collective contracts showed that a wide dispersion of wage rates had occurred once the
benchmark of leading annual awards disappeared. Those with skills in high
demand benefited, while pay and conditions in areas like food retailing, hotels and cafes, education, other retailing, mining, and health declined. There
was a significant loss of overtime and penalty rates, especially in the services sector, with almost half the contracts surveyed containing no penalty
rates for night or weekend work. Where those rates remained, their levels
were frequently eroded. Standard clock hours clauses, above which a premium was paid, applied in just over half of contracts. Limitation on the 40hour week had gone; although few workers were contractually required to
work longer hours, many had to be available to work on any day. Where
unions were weak, increases in total wages were generally lower, cuts to
overtime were greatest, and more workers were moved onto part-time and
casual employment. Negotiating and hiring costs tended to be greater where
unions were stronger.
The term of collective coverage had also changed. The traditional 12month term applied to just 29 percent of employees; 45 percent of employees were on contracts for two or more years. Some contracts did not specify
an expiry date. Longer contracts were prevalent in manufacturing, utilities,
construction, other retailing, accommodation and cafes, and communication
sectors. Raw wage increases tend to be higher the longer the contract, and
were nearly twice the annualized wage increase; but the benefits depended
on expected inflation rates, and whether increases were backdated. 5

53. STATISTICS NEw ZEALAND, KEY STATISTICS 44, Table 4.02 (No. 1996).

54. CTU, Post-electionPriorities-A Union View 62-63 (1996).
55. RAYMOND HARBRIDGE Er AL., EMPLOYMENT CONTRACrS: BARGAINING TRENDS AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 1995/96 (1996).
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Sectoral Impact of the ECA
As mentioned earlier, the impact of the Act was compounded by other
components of the structural adjustment program-internal market deregulation, trade liberalization, privatization, state sector restructuring, structural
unemployment and under-employment, and economic instability due to the
Reserve Bank's rigid anti-inflationary strategy. The impact of different
policies varied across sectors, as the following examples show.
Retail Workers
Retail workers were affected by a combination of pressures. The retail
sector was extremely competitive, especially following the deregulation of
shop trading hours, and faced constant rationalization through international
mergers and takeovers. Benefit cuts in 1991 reduced workers' options and
depressed retail spending. Unemployment remained historically high among
the unskilled, creating intense competition for jobs. Under-employment
meant many part-time workers, especially women, wanted more hours, even
at lower pay. The sector's unions had prepared for the impact of the ECA by
a pragmatic mix of strategies. These included amalgamations, composite
union enterprise agreements, extension of union services, concentration on
key sites, and ensuring the financial security and modernization of the union.
Once the Act was passed, the National Distribution Union (NDU)
moved to secure benchmark contracts with major employers, especially at
the national company level. Some were cooperative. Others displayed a
range of tactics which became increasingly familiar: refusing to negotiate
with unions, preventing access, running anti-union campaigns, pressuring
non-union members to sign contracts, threatening mass redundancy or loss
of investment, appointing consultation groups in which union was only part,
and encouraging the appointment of workplace representatives to speak for
all workers, with unions representing only a few. Some began to use off-theshelf contracts developed by employment consultants who were often former union officials. The employers' explicit goal was to deunionize. Union
membership was around 20,000 retail workers when the ECA came into effect. By May 1996, it was 8,400, a drop of 58 percent. The union reported
that it survived best where it had good worksite organization.
The effects on retail workers were well documented in a 1996 study by
the Northern Distribution Union (NDU), which reported widespread removal of penal rates/overtime; removal of most allowances; greater casualization of labor and insecurity of hours; reduced working hours for many,
with long hours for key staff; no recognizable increase in paid hours
worked; significant conflict between employers and workers; and new
workers employed on inferior conditions. Shocking abuses of young workers in retail and food outlets forced the introduction of youth rates in 1993.
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Women, as the majority of retail workers, remained disproportionately on
the periphery or in the secondary labor market, and the erosion of clock
hours and penal rates created major problems during school holidays,
nights, and weekends. Maori workers, especially women, also remained on
the periphery, while the language difficulties of Pacific Islands workersagain mainly women-and their customary respect for authority were
widely exploited. The union reported some advances during 1996 in youth
rates, paid parental leave, and small contributions by employers to superannuation. But overall, retail workers had less bargaining strength, lower levels of unionization, and progressively worse pay and conditions under the
ECA.
Privatization:Telecom
Privatization raised different concerns for workers, unions, and poor
consumers. The conversion of "commercial" government activities into
state-owned enterprises enabled the government to remove preferential employment conditions for state workers and to embark on massive job cuts. In
the 1986/87 financial year alone, one quarter of the state sector staff was affected, with 11 percent moved into state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 8 percent into new departments, and another 6 percent taking redundancy or early
retirement.'
The nine new SOEs created in 1986 had employed around 70,000 people. Five years later only half the original SOE workforce still had their jobs
as a result of redundancies, contracting out, and the privatization program.
Forestry fell 7,000 to 2,500; rail from 15,000 to 6,000; and Telecom from
24,500 to 16,500.58 Many of the redundant workers were re-employed on
contract, where employers had few obligations and where competition reduced labor costs, especially in rural areas. Other services were terminated.
Rural communities whose development had been part of the rationale for
establishing these operations were left to wither, and sometimes die. Maori
tribes, who had been promised employment and protection of sacred sites in
return for use of their land, were peremptorily cast aside and forced to litigate to safeguard their claims over the land.59
Among the most contentious of the privatizations was Telecom,
which was sold to Bell Atlantic and Ameritech for $4.25 billion in 1990.
(Local corporates Fay Richwhite and Freightways picked up 5 percent
56.
(1996).

NORTHERN DISTRIBUTON UNION, SHORT CHANGED. RETAIL WORKERS AND THE ECA

57. Rod Deane, Reforming the Public Sector, in ROGERNOMIcs:

RESHAPING NEW

ZEALAND'S ECONOMY 133 (Simon Walker ed., 1989).
58. KELSEY, supra note 40, at 123.
59. This was challenged by lengthy litigation which provided nuisance value, but failed
to prevent the privatization program. See JANE KELSEY, A QUESTION OF HONOUR? LABOuR
AND THE TREATY 1984-1989, chs. 3-5, 8, 9 (1990).
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each.) The predominantly U.S. owners secured an average 28 percent annual
return over the next five years through dividends, share sales, and balance
sheet restructuring. Telecom's effective monopoly saw its profits rise from
$257 million in March 1990 to $716 million or almost $2 million a day in
the year to March 1996, with a return on equity of around 30 percent. Net
profit for the half year to September 1996 was $361 million, 6.8 percent up
from the year before. Net earnings per share were 9.7 cents, of which 9.5
cents were distributed as dividend, making it a major invisible export from
New Zealand. In the process, many telecommunication services for commercial users and toll calls became cheaper and new technologies were introduced. But unregulated domestic prices increased as Telecom stopped
cross-subsidizing them from more profitable operations.
Telecom's profitability was sustained largely by continued cuts to its
workforce. In six years it more than doubled its profits and almost halved its
staff. From 1991 to 1995, wages rose 5 percent, productivity 13 percent, and
net earnings 114 percent. Staff numbers were cut from 16,263 in September
1989, to 9,257 in 1994, and 8,568 in 1995. Redundancies continued, even
though staff numbers grew by 2.6 percent in 1995/96. The target was 7,500
employees by April 1997. Loss of experienced staff was blamed for a rash
of exchange problems and slipping service standards in 1995 and again in
1996. 60
Leaked internal memoranda showed a concerted strategy to deunionize
the workforce and move workers onto individual contracts." In June 1996,
when the existing collective expired, Telecom told the Engineers Union it
wanted to break the single collective into four. A 24-hour strike of all Telecom workers was followed by technicians refusing overtime or callouts indefinitely. A year later the dispute remained unresolved, and intermittent
worker-initiated industrial action continued.'
Public Service Workers
State sector restructuring saw the residual public service severely cut
back and commercialized. From 71,000 employed in the state sector in
1988, only 32,900 remained at the end of 1996. Some had gone to new
Crown entities and SOEs; many had not. The State Sector Act 1988 obliged
the State Services Commission (SSC) and government departments to be
"4good employers." But their practices were often more ruthless than their
private sector counterparts, as the government's policy of fiscal restraint and
60. Rain Dashes Early Phone Repair Hopes for Telecom, N.Z. HERALD July 23, 1996;
Phone Fixing Delay Sets New Recordfor Telecom, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 3, 1996.
61. CIrY VOICE, Jan. 18, 1996.
62. Telecom, in 83 FOREIGN CONTROL WATCHDOG 20, 21-22 (1996); Telecom Facing

Even More Disruption,N.Z. HERALD, July 20, 1996; Telecom Staff Lift 7-week Overtime Ban,
N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 22 1996; Telecom Faces New Round of Protests, N.Z. HERALD, Dec. 19,
1996; Telecom Troubles: Two Sides of the Coin, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 27, 1997.
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its industrial role as employer became intertwined. Former leading unionists
were recruited as consultants to advise the SSC and departments on their
employment strategy.' In theory, chief executives (CEOs) had full authority
over their staff, including pay and conditions of appointment. But the SSC,
backed by the Cabinet Committee on State Sector Employment, played a
highly directive role. The Cabinet's "expectations" for the 1992/93 wage
round included fiscal restraint; no additional money for wages; outcomes
that are fiscally neutral at minimum, and preferably fiscally positive (i.e.,
cuts); vigorous negotiations that seek to increase productivity; overgenerous redundancy provisions to be reduced; transition costs in any restructuring to be minimized; flow-on effects to other departments to be

taken into account; and CEOs to keep the SSC informed. '
The SSC argued that the projected budget deficit for 1992/93 required
fiscal savings to be made. Yet in 1994/95, when the budget was in surplus,
the same expectations and demands to cut costs still applied. The sinking lid
on departmental budgets, and performance incentives for CEOs to meet expenditure targets, encouraged nil or negative pay adjustments and reductions
in redundancy, overtime, and penalty rates. Low morale and high turnover
contributed to deprofessionalization in some state agencies staffed by an increasingly deskilled and casualized workforce. The institutional memory of
central government had been jeopardized. A PSA pilot audit of public service staff in 1996 confirmed workers' concerns that qualities of professionalism, loyalty, innovation, integrity, and commitment to public well-being
were being subordinated to the goals of efficiency and managerialism.
Meanwhile, politicians had distanced themselves from responsibility for the
operation and inadequacies of the state sector.
A number of these concerns were confirmed in a report by U.S. academic Allen Schick on the state sector restructuring, which had been commissioned by the Treasury and SSC, and was released quietly in August
1996.65 While Schick was positive about the impact of increased managerial
incentives and autonomy, he expressed strong reservations about the textbook application of new institutional economics, with its underlying assumption that public servants are self-interested and inefficient.66 The resulting "hard-edged contractualism,"7 combined with fiscal cuts, imposed
stressful workloads on staff, potentially weakened collective values, and
undermined departments' institutional capacity to deliver longer-term economic and social goals.
Despite all these concerns, the PSA pilot audit reported that the new re63. NeutralisePSA Urges Consultant, PUB. SERVICE Ass'N J., May 1993.
64. KELSEY, supra note 40, at 141.
65. ALLEN SCHICK, THE SPIRIT OF REFORM. MANAGING THE NEw ZEALAND STATE SECTOR
INA TIME OF CHANGE (1996).
66. Id. at ch. 2.
67. Referring, in particular, to The State Sector Act 1988, Public Finance Act 1989, and
Employment Contracts Act 1991.
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gime had become the accepted norm:
There was an interesting reflection of the new structures as simply being
what is there, and what agencies now do. They had assumed an identity
quite distinct from the departments they grew out of. This outlook sug-

gests that with time, the new order becomes the established order and
there is a loss of an historical appreciation of what used to be and why it
was that way.6
In another indication of the normalization process, approval of the ECA
among PSA members increased from 21 percent approval and 70 percent
disapproval in the 1992 survey to 38 percent approval in 1996, mainly
among management, higher incomes, and under 30s (up 7 percent on 1995);
50 percent still disapproved.' Such radical changes required the PSA to rethink its marketing and recruitment strategy. A 1996 survey of PSA members showed that 20 percent joined for cost-benefit reasons, not because
they believed in unions or wanted to be part of a collective. However, members who were collectivist, believed in unions, and were committed to union
principles still amounted to 45 percent. The outbreak of industrial action
across the state sector in 1996 reflected the strong commitment of many
rank and file workers to direct action, despite the more conservative and
managerial approach of the union executive. Significantly, however, a massive 84 percent did not want to be actively involved in the PSA, meaning the
future direction of the union would rest largely in the hands of the executive.70

The PSA also faced significant pressure from Maori to move beyond
the rhetoric of bi-culturalism to promote internal processes and external
policies that genuinely reflected the rights of Maori self-determination in
the Treaty of Waitangi. In response, the PSA eventually established a parallel organizational and decision-making process. While there was some
genuine goodwill on both sides, the relationship remained tense and the organization's commitment tenuous.
Railways
The combined impact of unemployment, the ECA, and privatization
flowed over into health and safety issues, as exemplified by Tranz Rail.
New Zealand Rail was one of the original SOEs under the State-owned Enterprises Act 1986. Between 1987 and 1992, staff numbers were cut from
15,000 to 6,000, as the government prepared it for sale. The SOE was sold
to a consortium of Wisconsin Railways, a U.S. bank, and New Zealand investment bankers Fay Richwhite for $400 million in 1993. Revenue per em68. THE WORKERS' AuDrr: DOWNSIZING
(Mar. 1996).
69. PUB. SERVICE ASS'N J., Sept. 1996.
70. See infra note 80.

THE STATE SECTOR VIEWS AND EXPERIENCES
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ployee increased around 14 percent in 1993-95, with personnel costs falling
4.6 percent in 1994 and 6.6 percent in 1995. By 1996 staff levels had been
reduced by 11 percent over those of 1993.
Aside from pay and conditions, the main concern for the Rail and
Maritime Transport Union was workplace safety. Contracting out, casualization, and redundancies imposed strong pressures on the remaining workers to accept new jobs for which they were not properly trained and to meet
tight deadlines. Accident levels predictably increased. Tranz Rail was convicted in November 1996 under the Health and Safety in Employment Act
for failing to take all practicable steps to ensure the safety of an employee
who died in a shunting operation.7 Shunting operations had been pared back
to one locomotive driver communicating by remote with a lone operator on
the ground. The judge held that the accident was a direct result of a business
decision to cut costs by reducing staff numbers, inadequate training and
monitoring, and pressure on workers to accept jobs from fear of redundancy.
The company was fined $30,000, of which $20,000 went to the family of the
victim-an increasingly common practice used by the court to off-set the
abolition of lump sum compensation under the Accident Rehabilitation and
Compensation Insurance Act 1992.
In all these sectors, the ECA gave employers vital leverage to increase profits, reduce labor costs, and minimize resistance. In doing so, they
built on other components of the restructuring. Despite the apparently irresistible erosion of workers' and union rights, some suggest that this trend is
short term. In 1996 Harbridge reflected that employers who made radical
changes within two years of the ECA had met little resistance and achieved
their goals.72 Those who waited five years found a different environment:
shortage of skilled labor, a residual rump of unionism, and a workforce resistant to further erosion of employment conditions. He doubted whether the
original momentum could be maintained-and whether some employers
would want to do so. However, this more optimistic prognosis must be seen
as relative, given the severely demoralized state of the union movement, its
falling membership and resources, and the limited bargaining power of organized labor in an economy where officials deem a "natural" rate of unemployment to be around 6 percent-especially as the economy threatened to
slip once more into recession.73
A HIGH-PRODUCTIVITY, HIGH-EMPLOYMENT WORKFORCE?

By 1996 questions were also emerging about whether the ECA would
71. Department of Labour v. Tranz Rail, District Court, Wellington (Nov. 22, 1996).
72. Awards made to employees represented 40 percent of the fines imposed under the
Act in the year to Dec. 1995. RAYMOND HARBRIDGE ET AL. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS:
BARGAINING TRENDS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 1995/96, at 51 (1996).
73. GDP growth for the first quarter of 1997 was -0.5 percent. STATISTICS NEW
ZEALAND, KEY STATISTICS 127, Table 10.07 (Sept. 1997).
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deliver the promised long-term gains. Deunionization and reduced labor
costs were supposedly means to an end, not ends in themselves. Increased
flexibility and lower costs were meant to boost both productivity and employment, and to set the economy on a permanent growth path. The evidence on labor productivity gains is unconvincing. Economist Brian Philpott
calculates that the average labor productivity increase between 1992 and
1996 was about 0.7 percent per year, below the long-run productivity
growth rate of 1.3 percent between 1984 and 1996, and 1.9 percent between
1978 and 1984. 74 Productivity actually fell by around 1.6 percent in the
1995/96 financial year.75 Those increases which did occur were mainly nonrecurrent gains through reduced direct labor costs, relief from demarcation
disputes, and multi-tasking.76 But more people working for lower labor costs
does not mean productivity has increased; it merely shows income transfers
from labor to capital.
Nor, despite initial appearances, did the ECA solve the problem of
unemployment. Official unemployment (people working one hour or more a
week are defined as employed) had risen under Labour from 3.8 percent in
December 1985 to 7.7 percent in December 1990, and peaked at 11.1 percent in March 1992. Over the next four years, it fell equally dramatically to
6.2 percent in December 1995. However, in March 1996 employment
growth dropped steeply, overtime was heavily reduced, and manufacturers
reported staff cuts. Official unemployment statistics stopped falling and remained at 6.2 percent in March 1996, with an unexpected bounce-back in
official unemployment to 6.0 percent in June 1996. This was attributable
mainly to changes in labor force participation. The seasonally adjusted rate
for September 1996 was up again to 6.3 percent. The burden still fell most
heavily on Maori, at 15.9 percent, and Pacific Islanders at 14.3 percent,
while the European rate was 4.5 percent."
In November 1996, the economic research agency, Business Economic Research Ltd. (BERL), reported a fall of 27,000, or 6.8 percent, in
the number employed full-time in tradeable production, processing, and
manufacturing during the first nine months of the year. This number had
risen from 1,000 in the March quarter, to 8,000 in the June quarter, and
18,000 in the September quarter. BERL described the highly publicized
shifts of a number of major companies to Australia as "the tip of the ice74. Philpott, A Note on Recent Trends in Labour Productivity Growth, Research Project
on Economic Planning, Victoria University of Wellington (October 1996). See also THE
TREASURY, LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY-CAN WE CATCH THE MAGIC Bus? (Internal Working Paper, Aug. 1996).
75. Rt. Hon. Bill Birch, PRE-ELECTION ECONOMIC AND FISCAL UPDATE 49, Table 1.6
(Sept. 1996).
76. Raymond Harbridge, Parallels and Contrasts of the New Zealand Experience. Are
There Lessons to be Learned? (Paper to the AGSM Executive Development Programme,
Sydney, May 1996).
77. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND. KEY STATISTICS Table 3.06 (Nov. 1996).
78. Forecasts(Business Economic Research Ltd. (BERL)) Nov. 1996.
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berg."
The official unemployment statistics also disguised significant problems with the quality and sustainability of new jobs. There had been a
strong trend away from full-time work in the tradeable sector to part-time
work in services. By September 1996, there were still 28,100 or 2.1 percent
fewer full-time filled jobs-but 193,500 or 81.6 percent more part-time
filled jobs than in February 1987. Almost two-thirds of full-time workers
were male and almost three-quarters of part-time workers female. People
were also working longer hours and in more jobs than before. As the downturn set in, this trend intensified. Full-time employment increased by 15,000
in the year to September 1996, while part-time increased by 45,000. But in
the September 1996 quarter, part-time jobs had increased 25,000, while fulltime jobs had dropped by 10,000. Total job growth was below the natural
increase in the labor force, and unemployment was reliably predicted to
rise."'

Prospects for 1997 looked grim. As the economy moved from downturn
to incipient recession, the ability of workers to cite economic recovery in
support of pay increases had passed. Private sector workers, initially in export and import competing sectors, but later elsewhere, faced renewed
threats of redundancy and closures. As the tax take fell and government
failed to meet the projected budget surplus, government workers heard renewed calls for restraint. Young people seeking to enter the workforce were
pressed by government to pay their own way, or engage in "workfare,"
while employers sought to cut costs and length of industry training programs.
Looking to the Future
The structural impact of the Act on the labor market and unions means
future governments would find it hard to change tack even if they wanted to.
Whichever party was elected to government after the October 1996 election,
it was clear that the individual contract base for employment would remain.
The National Party was firmly committed to the Act, and favored demands
from the Employers' Federation and corporate allies for privatization of Accident Compensation and abandonment of the Employment Court; it was
more reserved about abolishing the minimum wage. New Zealand First
talked blandly of creating a more "reasonable" bargaining framework and a
better personal grievance procedure. Labour said it would introduce a new
Employment Relations Act that would "encourage" collective bargaining,
require bargaining in good faith, and provide legal recognition for unions.
Their Act would incorporate a minimum code on wages and conditions of

79. Projections for unemployment in 1998 by the respected NZIER were 6.8 percent in
NZIER ECONOMIC UPDATE 4 (June 1997) and 7.0 percent in NZIER ECONOMIC UPDATE 4
(Sept. 1997).
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employment. Labour would also increase the minimum wage. This proposal
largely mirrored the Alliance industrial relations policy, which, having been
announced first, had placed pressure on both Labour and the CTU.
A coalition government between National and New Zealand First proposed only minor changes to the ECA. These included access rights for unions that had been appointed as bargaining agents and a concept of "fair"
bargaining. As this required legislation, its implementation could be deferred, perhaps indefinitely. There was also a promise of an ongoing review
of the ECA's impact on security of employment and fairness, but no process
was proposed. Particularly ominous were proposals to retain the separate jurisdiction of the Employment Court, yet "conduct a formal study of the
Court's decisions to establish whether Parliament's intentions have been
clearly expressed for the purposes of minimizing judicial activism in the
employment area," and to review the Wages Protection Act, Minimum
Wage Act, and Holidays Act to bring them under the umbrella of the ECA.
Unions therefore face enormous, unrelenting pressure. Resources are
scarce, with many unions laying off their own staff. To survive, they need to
focus on organization, retention, and recruitment in the workplace and ensure that they are in tune with their actual and potential members' expectations, which are shifting in many unions. New, young workers under 30the "children of the market"-have known nothing except the neo-liberal
regime and have no historic understanding of, nor commitment to, unionism. For many older workers, individualist, market-oriented attitudes and
organizational arrangements are becoming the norm.8" At the same time,
unions have to balance these demands with the need to organize and resist
further erosion of pay and conditions, and to engage in broader political
struggles. Once they give away that role, they might as well convert themselves into a private consultancy.
It also means meeting the challenge posed by Maori workers that remains largely unaddressed. Some unions have attempted to restructure internally so Maori have a greater voice, but funding pressures and competing
priorities could see these hard-fought gains rapidly disappear. Other unions
with large Maori memberships, or overlapping interests, have engaged in
dialogue and joint political action with Maori, such as over the sale of Forestcorp immediately before the 1996 election. There is a clear commonality
of interest and potential for alliances here. But the processes, hierarchies,
priorities, and mindset of many unions, including the CTU, remain deeply
mono-cultural. The union movement as a whole is no closer to addressing
the core issues of decolonization and genuine sharing of power than it was
twenty years ago.
Unions play a much more marginal role today than they (believed they)
80. For example, the PSA's 1996 survey of its members identified a significant trend
among its membership: professionals and managerial staff are more interested in services currently provided by the union, but which could be offered by someone else. PSA Wins High
Approval Rating in Annual Survey, PUB. SERVICE ASS'N J., Dec. 1996.
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did in the past. The false security of state patronage and strategic political
alliances has been stripped away. They must stake out a clear role, establish
a mandate for that role from their membership, and work in collaboration
with others to create an environment where people believe there really are
alternatives. That requires alliances between unions and with other organizations and communities, which are based on synergies, not on desperation;
an end to hostile union takeovers; and less introspection and self-interest
from some of the existing union leadership. It also means revitalizing, in a
radically different way from the past, the political role of unions in the
struggle to deliver human dignity, employment security, and living social
wage, which is the right of paid workers and those unpaid workers on whom
they and the society depend.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol28/iss1/18

22

